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Quick Exits of Subprime Mortgages
Yuliya S. Demyanyk
All holders of mortgage contracts, regardless of type, have three options: keep their payments
current, prepay (usually through refinancing), or default on the loan. The latter two options termi-
nate the loan. The termination rates of subprime mortgages that originated each year from 2001
through 2006 are surprisingly similar: about 20, 50, and 80 percent, respectively, at one, two, and
three years after origination. For loans originated when house prices appreciated the most, termi-
nations were dominated by prepayments. For loans originated when the housing market slowed,
defaults dominated. The similarity of the loan termination rates for all vintages in the sample sug-
gests that subprime mortgage loans were intended to be “bridge” (i.e., temporary) loans. In addition,
between 2001 and 2006, the number of terminated subprime purchase-money loans (loans used to
purchase rather than refinance a house) outweighed the estimated number of first-time-homebuyers
with subprime mortgages. The effect of the subprime lending on the increase of homeownership
in the United States—a potentially positive outcome of subprime mortgages—most likely has been
overstated. (JEL D12, G1, G21)
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prime securitized market froze completely and
essentially died.
Researchers, policymakers, journalists, and
other individuals have offered many explanations
for the collapse of the subprime mortgage market,
including mortgage interest rate resets, fraud, poor
underwriting, discrimination, a housing market
slowdown, and deterioration of loan quality (due
to unobserved or unexplored borrower informa-
tion). The negative consequences of this market’s
collapse are well known and well publicized. The
effects include foreclosures and defaults, impaired
credit histories for borrowers, reduced housing
values, destabilized neighborhoods as a result of
vacant properties, and an overall slowdown in
many segments of the economy.
But aside from these pitfalls, did subprime
lending have any benefits, even if they were much
T
he subprime mortgage market boomed
between 2001 and 2006 and began to
collapse in 2007.1 Initial signs of the
collapse were poor performance and
even default of loans,2 often within months of
their origination: The delinquency, default, and
foreclosure rates of subprime loans that were
originated in 2006 and 2007 were three times
higher than in earlier years. In 2008, the sub-
1 The term “subprime,” at times used imprecisely, essentially can
describe (i) borrowers with a low credit score, history of delinquency
or bankruptcy, or poor employment history; (ii) lenders specializing
in high-cost loans and selling fewer loans to government-sponsored
enterprises; (iii) securities that encompass a subprime loan (the
most- to least-risky of which are subprime, Alt-A, and prime); and
(iv) certain mortgages (e.g., 2/28 or 3/27 “hybrid” mortgages) gener-
ally not available in the prime market.
2 Here, “default” is used to indicate the protracted failure to meet
the terms of a mortgage loan agreement, ending in foreclosure;
“early default” is defined later in the paper.
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dence suggests that the subprime market, with
its easier mortgage financing, may have promoted
U.S. homeownership. The rationale is that, even
if default rates are about 20 percent for the most
recent vintage of subprime mortgages, 80 percent
of subprime borrowers are still making their
monthly payments. Given this view, the financial
innovation that spawned subprime lending may
have promoted homeownership, and thus the
majority of borrowers benefited because they most
likely would not have qualified for mortgages
under terms in the prime market.
This paper attempts to analyze whether bor-
rowers intended to keep their subprime mortgages
long enough to substantiate an increase in home-
ownership or planned a quick exit strategy at origi-
nation, using subprime loans as bridge financing
to speculate on house prices (i.e., quickly sell the
house for a profit after its value increases).
“Exit” from a subprime mortgage can take
two forms: prepayment or default. In this study,
a mortgage loan is considered “prepaid” if a bor-
rower has either paid the mortgage loan in full or
refinanced it within a certain period after the loan
was originated. A mortgage loan is “in default” if
(i) a borrower has missed more than two mortgage
payments, (ii) the property is in the process of
foreclosure (after more missed payments), (iii) the
property is “real-estate owned” (i.e., has been
taken over by the lender as part of the loan termi-
nation3 process) within a certain period of time
after origination, or (iv) the borrower defaults on
the contract (“walks away”).
The paper is organized as follows. First, it
briefly describes the evolution of the U.S. sub-
prime mortgage market, the crisis, and some of
the earlier research that analyzes factors associ-
ated with loan termination (exit from the market).
Second, it outlines the empirical analysis of
explanatory factors of prepayment, default, and
termination (prepayment and default combined)
within two years of loan origination; it further
compares the number of prepaid and defaulted
loans per year within two years of origination.
Third, it points to the quick termination of sub-
prime loans, indicating that these loans must
have been designed and intended to be temporary
and their existence most likely did not contribute
to increased homeownership rates in the United
States between 2001 and 2006.
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS:
HIGH DEFAULT RATES
The boom and subsequent collapse of the sub-
prime mortgage market has drawn the attention
of numerous researchers and policymakers. This
analysis of delinquencies and foreclosures is not
new. For example, Von Furstenberg and Green
(1974) analyzed the causes of mortgage delinquen-
cies, apart from foreclosures and defaults, for
mortgages originated between 1961 and 1972.
They refer to and confirm findings published as
early as 1969 and 1970 (by Von Furstenberg) that
such factors as high loan-to-value (LTV) ratios (or
equity-to-value ratios) and low borrower income
are important determinants of mortgage default,
ceteris paribus. Thus, these findings were known
some three decades before these subprime issues
unfolded, before very large LTVs were deemed
“acceptable,” and so-called no-income, no-
documentation, no-asset mortgage loans were
introduced.
In a more recent, but precrisis analysis, Cutts
and Van Order (2005) suggest that several eco-
nomic models can, in fact, explain the main char-
acteristics of the subprime market. In particular,
“option-based” models are consistent with pricing
and loan characteristics of subprime mortgages
(for example, improving a borrower’s credit score
makes refinancing more likely); “separating equi-
librium” models sort borrowers into prime and
subprime markets through signaling mechanisms;
and “adverse selection” models are consistent
with the choice between the lower costs of the
secondary market and the information advantages
of the primary market. However, many issues
were and still are beyond fundamental and con-
ventional economic modeling. For instance,
Demyanyk (2008) shows that the Fair Isaac and
Company (FICO) credit score failed to predict the
Demyanyk
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3 In this paper, the terms “exit” and “termination” are used 
interchangeably.subprime mortgage crisis, even though it is one of
the most important determinants of serious delin-
quency and foreclosure in mortgage lending.4
Pennington-Cross and Chomsisengphet (2007)
studied a sample of subprime securitized loans—
first-lien, fixed-rate, homeowner-occupied—that
originated between 1996 and 2003. The authors
note that borrowers with subprime mortgages are
more likely to cash-out refinance compared with
those with prime mortgages.5 Moreover, subprime
borrowers seem to substitute mortgage debt for
credit card debt and auto loans: They tend to
refinance their mortgages when interest rates on
credit cards and auto financing rise. Analyzing
the performance of subprime loans, the authors
observed that cash-out refinances tend to default
and prepay less frequently than non-cash-out
refinances. Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008)
observed that cash-out refinances between 2001
and 2007 tended to default less frequently than
even purchase-money mortgages.
Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008) were
among the first to analyze the subprime mortgage
crisis in detail. Using loan-level data, they first
showed that—contrary to popular belief—the
subprime crisis of 2007 was not confined to a
particular market segment, such as loans with
mortgage rates scheduled to increase or no-
documentation loans. Instead, it was a (subprime)
marketwide phenomenon. Second, they identified
factors most likely to be associated with a larger
probability that a subprime mortgage loan would
become seriously delinquent: FICO credit score,
combined LTV (CLTV) ratio, mortgage interest rate,
and house price appreciation between the period
of loan origination and the loan-performance
evaluation. These factors were not sufficiently
different in the crisis years (2006 and 2007) than
in the earlier years and thus do not entirely explain
the crisis, its magnitude, or its timing. Even house
price appreciation does not explain—by itself or
in a combination with other factors (a phenome-
non called risk layering)—why the subprime
crisis was so rapid and large.
Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008) also
showed the presence of nonmeasurable risk in
these mortgage contracts and the increased risk
over time. More specifically, they first adjusted
mortgage performance for values of observable
borrowers’ characteristics at origination (e.g.,
credit scores, LTV ratios, debt-to-income ratios),
loan characteristics (e.g., fixed-rate mortgage [FRM]
or hybrid mortgage, if homeowner-occupied,
presence of prepayment penalty clause), and
macroeconomic conditions (e.g., change in unem-
ployment, household income, house price appre-
ciation since origination). Second, they calculated
the adjusted performance of the loans for all
vintage/loan age combinations in their sample;
this exercise revealed that the market has wors-
ened each year, monotonically and dramatically,
since 2001. In other words, the crisis did not
emerge suddenly in 2007 or 2008. It had been
brewing for at least six years prior.
Even though this scenario and time frame are
not readily observable by looking at the data—a
statistical exercise is needed to see the deteriora-
tion of the subprime market—Demyanyk and
Van Hemert (2008) show that securitizers, those
who mostly dictated mortgage rates in the market,
were to some extent aware of this gradual deteri-
oration. The decline in loan quality was mono  -
tonic but not equally spread among different types
of borrowers. Over time, loans with high LTV
ratios had higher adjusted delinquency, foreclo-
sure, and defaults rates. Securitizers started to link
mortgage interest rates to LTV ratios; obviously,
they did not do so enough. Loan quality deterio-
rated while loan riskiness increased every year
from 2001 to 2007; however, the price of risk—
the subprime-prime markup—in fact, declined.
The combination of increasing loan riskiness and
decreasing prices was not sustainable. In 2008,
the market collapsed and massive foreclosures,
bank failures, and a credit crunch followed.
Haughwout, Peach, and Tracy (2008) took the
analysis by Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008) a
step further and analyzed early defaults of sub-
prime mortgages. “Early default” is defined as
either delinquency (missed payments) for more
Demyanyk
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4 For a more detailed discussion of delinquency and foreclosure
determinants, see Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008).
5 A term “cash-out” refinance refers to a situation when a borrower
refinances an existing mortgage loan into a larger one, taking cash
out. This, by definition, means that a borrower is extracting the
equity from the house.than 60 days or foreclosure within the first year
after origination. Haughwout, Peace, and Tracy
(2008) confirm the finding of Demyanyk and Van
Hemert (2008) that, although credit/lending stan-
dards are important determinants of early default,
they alone cannot explain the timing and the
magnitude of the crisis in 2007 and 2008. They
also confirm that, even if depreciation in house
prices is an important determinant of increased
delinquencies and foreclosures in the immediate
precrisis years, a large portion of the increase in
serious delinquencies remains unexplained. On
the other hand, Keys et al. (2008) found that
(observed) lending standards in the subprime
mortgage market did deteriorate; and the main
driving force of the deterioration was the securi-
tization of those loans.
In their analysis of the subprime crisis, Mian
and Sufi (2008) suggest that securitization of
mortgage assets may have increased the supply
of credit in geographic areas that had relatively
more mortgage application rejections a decade
before the crisis (in 1996); such credit allowed
more home purchases and thereby could have led
to the rapid increases in house prices between 2001
and 2005. When housing values started declining,
between 2005 and 2007, defaults followed.
Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2007), using a
unique dataset covering the homeownership
experience in Massachusetts between 1989 and
2007, found that homeownership that began with
a subprime mortgage ended in foreclosure 20 per-
cent of the time; importantly, this number is about
six times larger than a corresponding share of
homeowners who started with prime mortgages.
Foote et al. (2008) find that, based on the same
dataset, almost half of residential foreclosures
are concentrated in subprime mortgages, even if
the subprime mortgage was a refinance of a prime
loan.
Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2008) argue that
even though borrowers facing negative equity in
their houses are more likely to default, they may
not default in the absence of an idiosyncratic
shock, such as illness, divorce, or the loss of a
job. Also, borrowers need to consider if the cost
of default—which includes the cost of renting
after the default—outweighs a potential (future)
benefit from home equity, should the home price
increase in the future. In other words, negative
equity is a necessary but not a sufficient condi-
tion for default.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LOAN
TERMINATIONS
A simple logit model was used to calculate
the impact of a set of explanatory factors—such
as borrower and loan characteristics and house
price appreciation in the area surrounding the
property—on the probability of either prepayment
or default. According to the estimated results, the
main factors affecting the probability of prepay-
ment within two years of origination are (i) house
price appreciation (pre-origination and post-
origination), (ii) the presence of prepayment penal-
ties, (iii) the resetting structure of mortgage rates
(as with hybrid mortgages), and (iv) the CLTV
ratio, which measures the amount of equity in the
house. The main factors affecting the probability
of default within two years of origination are (i)
the FICO credit score, (ii) the CLTV ratio, (iii) the
mortgage rate, and (iv) post-origination house
price appreciation. Notably, the credit score affects
only the likelihood of default, not prepayment;
and pre-origination house price appreciation
affects only prepayment, not default. Borrowers
with hybrid mortgages do tend to prepay and
default more often than those with FRMs (see
Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2008, for supporting
evidence); however, ceteris paribus, the sole fact
that a mortgage loan is a hybrid is not a strong
predictor of default.
The factors that most affect prepayments and
defaults were not substantially different in the
precrisis years, with the exception of house price
appreciation. For loans originated in 2003 and
2004, high house price appreciation is the main
contributing factor for high prepayment rates.
For loans originated in 2005 and 2006, low house
price appreciation is the main contributor for the
high default rates. Although house price depreci-
ation is the main contributing factor, it is not the
sole explanation for the magnitude of the crisis:
The default rates are higher than what can be
explained by housing market factors alone.
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their mortgages have been analyzed in the context
of the pricing of mortgage contracts for decades.
Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) provide an
extensive literature review describing earlier
analysis of prepayment only, default only, and
default and prepayment as joint options. The
authors theoretically unify several economic
models to analyze prepayment and default options
considered by borrowers simultaneously and
empirically test this model on a sample of fixed-
rate, fully amortized loans that originated
between 1976 and 1983 and observed until the
first quarter of 1992. All these loans were pur-
chased by Freddie Mac. Even though the loans
were made and their performance evaluated long
before subprime issues emerged, the implica-
tions of this research are important: The authors
found evidence of the interdependence of the
decisions to prepay (akin to exercising a call
option) or default (akin to exercising a put option).
Forecasts that ignore this interdependence can
lead to serious errors in estimating the default
risk. For a related analysis, see Pennington-Cross
and Chomsisengphet (2007).
The following logit regression model is esti-
mated to analyze a random sample of subprime
securitized loans (between 2001 and 2006) as a
cross section:
Probability ￿Z￿ = ʦ￿ʲ′X￿,
where Z is either prepayment or default on (and
thus exit from) a subprime mortgage loan within
24 months of origination; ʦ￿x￿ = 1/￿1 + exp￿–x￿￿
is the logit function; x = ʲ′X; X is the vector of
explanatory variables; and ʲ is the vector of
regression coefficients.
The explanatory factors used in the analysis
are the FICO credit score, a dummy variable indi-
cating whether full documentation was provided
at origination, a dummy variable indicating
whether a prepayment penalty is present, the
debt-to-income ratio (back-end), a dummy variable
indicating whether a debt-to-income ratio is not
provided, the mortgage interest rate, a dummy
variable indicating whether a borrower is an
investor, a dummy variable indicating whether a
mortgage was a refinance at origination, the origi-
nation amount, the CLTV ratio, a margin for hybrid
loans, a dummy variable indicating whether a
mortgage is a hybrid, a dummy variable indicating
whether a mortgage is an adjustable rate-mortgage
(ARM, nonhybrid), a dummy variable indicating
whether a mortgage is a balloon, post-origination
house price appreciation (from loan origination
up to the point of loan performance evaluation,
up to three years later), and pre-origination house
price appreciation (from two years before origina-
tion up to origination). 
When to evaluate loan performance (within
two years of origination) was a choice driven
mainly by two factors: the FICO credit score and
the popularity of hybrid mortgages in the sample.
The FICO credit score, as with any credit score,
measures the creditworthiness of individuals or
businesses. Lenders/securitizers use these scores
to estimate the likelihood of eventual delinquency
or default. By design, the higher the credit score,
the less likely it is that a borrower will miss pay-
ments or go into default on a loan within one or
two years after the score has been calculated
(Demyanyk, 2008). The prevalence of hybrid
mortgages is also important. More than half of
subprime securitized mortgage loans are ARMs,
and almost all are so-called hybrid contract types,
which means they carry a fixed interest rate for
an initial period (usually two or three years) after
which the rate resets. Starting the analysis at two
(or three) years after origination eliminates the
effect on these loans of mortgage rates resetting
into a mostly larger market-driven rate plus a
margin. (See Demyanyk and Gopalan, 2007, for a
more detailed description and definitions.)
DATA AND VARIABLE 
DEFINITIONS
Loan-level data used for the analysis are
provided by the First American CoreLogic
LoanPerformance database, as of July 2008. In
the dataset, loan, borrower, and property charac-
teristics are provided for about half of all U.S. sub-
prime mortgages. All loans in this dataset have
been securitized. According to the Mortgage
Market Statistical Annual (2008), securitization
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cent (2002), 67.5 percent (2003), 62.6 percent
(2004), 67.7 percent (2005), 67.6 percent (2006),
74.2 percent (2007), and 77.3 percent (first six
months of 2008). Among all subprime mortgages,
the portion securitized ranged from 54 percent
in 2001 to 75 percent in 2006. For the empirical
analysis of this study, only first-lien subprime
mortgages are used. The variables used in the
analysis are defined as follows:
Cash-out: A dummy variable that equals 1 if
the mortgage loan is a cash-out refinancing
loan at origination and 0 otherwise.
CLTV ratio: The combined mortgage values
of all liens divided by the value of the
house at loan origination.
Debt-to-income ratio: The back-end debt-
to-income ratio; it is defined as total
monthly debt payments divided by gross
monthly income at origination. A higher
debt-to-income ratio (i.e., a higher degree of
indebtedness) makes it harder for a borrower
to make the monthly mortgage payment.
Default: A dummy variable that equals 1 if
(i) the borrower has missed more than two
monthly mortgage payments, (ii) the bor-
rower has defaulted on the loan (with the
foreclosure procedure finalized), or (iii) the
property is in foreclosure or is real-estate
owned (taken over by the lender) within the
first two years of origination; the variable
takes a value of 0 otherwise.
Documentation: A dummy variable that
equals 1 if full documentation on the loan
is provided and 0 otherwise.
FICO score: The FICO credit score at origi-
nation. The FICO score was recommended
for use in mortgage lending by Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac in 1995 as a measure of
borrowers’ creditworthiness. The higher
the FICO score, the less likely a borrower
will default on a loan within about two
years of loan origination. Given the nature
of FICO scores, it is expected that a relation-
ship will be found between borrowers’
scores and the incidence of default and fore-
closure during the subprime mortgage crisis.
Investor: A dummy variable that equals 1
if the borrower is an investor and does not
owner-occupy the property and 0 otherwise.
Margin: The additional percentage points
for an ARM or hybrid mortgage over an
index interest rate, usually the six-month
LIBOR rate, applicable after the first interest
rate reset. The higher the margin, the higher
the interest rate after the reset, which
increases the monthly mortgage payments.
Missing debt-to-income: A dummy variable
that equals 1 if the back-end debt-to-income
ratio was not provided in the data (reported
as 0); the variable takes a value of 0 other-
wise. In the data, the debt-to-income value
was not reported for approximately 30 per-
cent of loans.
Mortgage rate: The initial interest rate as
of the first payment date. A higher interest
rate makes monthly mortgage payments
larger and, therefore, can make it more
difficult for a borrower to make timely
monthly mortgage payments.
Origination amount: The size of the mort-
gage loan. Loan size can affect the size of a
monthly mortgage payment: The larger the
loan, the larger the monthly payment, and
the harder it can be for a borrower to make
those payments in a timely manner. Also,
a borrower’s creditworthiness can affect the
size of the loan: Less-risky borrowers may
be expected to get larger loans. Which of
the two effects is dominant is an empirical
question addressed later in this study.
Post-origination house price appreciation:
The metropolitan statistical area (MSA)–
level house price appreciation from the time
of loan origination to the time the perfor  -
mance of the loan is evaluated. Apprecia  -
tion is measured as a ratio of the house price
indexes reported by the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight (now the
Federal Housing Finance Agency) for the
two corresponding periods.
Pre-origination house price appreciation:
The MSA-level house price appreciation
two years before mortgage origination and
origination period.
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1 if a borrower has either paid off or refi-
nanced a mortgage loan within two years
of origination; the variable takes a value of
0 otherwise.
Prepayment penalty: A dummy variable
that equals 1 if a prepayment penalty is 
associated with a loan and 0 otherwise.
Product type: Major types in the subprime
mortgage market include FRMs, hybrid
mortgages, ARMs, and balloons. Three
dummy variables for the latter three are
included in the regression analysis; the
magnitude of their impact therefore should
be interpreted as the effect on the probabil-
ity of prepayment, default, or exit relative
to an FRM. The FRM is chosen as a bench-
mark because FRMs show the smallest
expected and realized probability of default.
Termination: A dummy variable that equals
1 if a borrower has either defaulted or pre-
paid the mortgage loan within two years
of origination; the variable takes a value of
0 otherwise.
EXPLANATORY FACTORS OF
PREPAYMENT, DEFAULT, AND EXIT
Prepayment
House price appreciation occurring within
two years of origination has the largest impact
on the probability of a borrower to prepay or
refinance a loan (see Table 1, column 1). An
increase in house price appreciation of 1 standard
deviation (SD) above its mean is associated with
a 13-percentage-point increase in the likelihood
that a loan will be prepaid, ceteris paribus. If
house prices in the area appreciated 1 SD above
the mean two years before origination, there is a
7-percentage-point increase in the likelihood a
loan will be prepaid. This perhaps indicates that
individuals build their expectations about future
home values based on immediate past values (or
the past trends).
Borrowers with hybrid mortgages tend to pre-
pay more often; all other factors being the same,
if a loan is a hybrid and has a mortgage rate sched-
uled to reset in two or three years, the probability
of prepayment increases by about 5.5 percentage
points. Loan originators and securitizers must have
been aware of this pattern; and so, to compensate
for the expected losses of interest payments (pay-
ments borrowers never make if they prepay the
loan before the end of the term), they imposed
prepayment penalties on about 70 percent of sub-
prime securitized mortgages. The prepayment
penalty factor has its expected effect on the prob-
ability of prepayment: It decreases it—specifically,
by about 6 percent within two years of origination.
The mortgage rate at origination plays an
important role as well: The higher the rate, the
higher the chance a loan will be prepaid within
its first two years. The marginal effect of the mort-
gage rate is approximately 5 percentage points.
A loan’s purpose at origination also affects
prepayment. If a mortgage is originated to refi-
nance an existing mortgage, it is more likely to be
refinanced again after two years or less, compared
with home purchase (purchase-money) loans.
Also, the smaller the down payment at origi-
nation, the less likely a borrower is to prepay or
refinance a loan within two years of origination.
In unfavorable economic circumstances, such as
a housing market slowdown or job loss, ceteris
paribus, a borrower would be expected to default
rather than refinance a mortgage that had little
equity.
The more expensive a property was at origi-
nation, the more likely its mortgage will be refi-
nanced or prepaid. A larger origination amount
is associated with larger monthly mortgage pay-
ment. The greater incentive to refinance more
expensive properties may be a desire to lower
monthly payments or a need to extract cash to
cope with those (larger) monthly payments.
Default
The marginal effects of individual factors on
the probability of default are listed in column 2
of Table 1. Four major factors seem to most affect
the probability of default two years after origina-
tion: post-origination house price appreciation,
FICO credit score, CLTV ratio, and the mortgage
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results obtained by Demyanyk and Van Hemert
(2008), who estimated the effects of those factors
on the probability of serious delinquency one year
after origination. According to the estimates, a
1 SD increase in the FICO credit score, ceteris
paribus, is associated with a decrease in a proba-
bility of default by 3.3 percentage points. Note
that the credit score has almost no explanatory
power for prepayment but is a critical factor in
explaining defaults.
According to the estimates, a 1 SD increase in
house value appreciation measured at the MSA-
level is associated with a 4.3-percentage-point
decrease in the likelihood of default; the effect on
prepayments and refinancing is about three times
larger and has the opposite sign as expected. The
difference in the absolute values of the marginal
effects reflects an asymmetry in how equity
affects different actions taken by the borrower. An
increase in appreciation increases the probability
of prepayment much more than it decreases the
probability of default. Pre-origination house price
appreciation, even though it has an economically
significant impact on prepayments, has almost no
effect on defaults.
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Table 1
Impact of Individual Factors on the Probability of Prepayment, Default, or Exit within Two Years
of Mortgage Loan Origination (2001-06)
Explanatory factor Prepayment Default Exit
FICO credit score 0.19* –3.28*** –4.11***
If full documentation is provided (dummy) 0.38*** –1.31*** –1.21***
If prepayment penalty is present (dummy) –6.27*** 0.65*** –5.29***
Debt-to-income ratio (back end) 1.58*** 1.28*** 3.12***
If debt-to-income ratio is not provided (dummy) 1.17*** 1.01*** 2.28***
Mortgage interest rate 5.23** 2.27*** 7.76***
If an investor (dummy) –1.05*** 0.93*** 0.00
If a mortgage is for refinancing at origination (dummy)  2.68*** –1.08*** 0.73***
Origination amount 3.03*** 0.75*** 4.16***
Combined loan-to-value ratio –4.24*** 4.34*** –0.89***
Margin for hybrid loans  0.46*** 0.85*** 2.26***
If a hybrid (dummy) 5.53*** 0.36*** 4.30***
If an ARM (dummy) 1.60*** 0.05 1.64***
If a balloon (dummy 0.72*** 0.51*** 1.48***
Post-origination house price appreciation 13.28*** –4.29*** 7.31***
Pre-origination house price appreciation 7.31*** –0.46*** 6.39***
NOTE: A mortgage loan is considered “prepaid” if a borrower has either prepaid or refinanced a mortgage loan within a certain period
after loan origination. A mortgage loan is considered in “default” if a borrower has defaulted on a loan or has missed more than two
mortgage payments or the property is in the process of foreclosure or is real-estate owned (i.e., is likely to default) within 2 years of
origination. “Exit” from a subprime mortgage is either prepayment or default. The reported results are the marginal effects of each
variable i calculated as follows:
MEFFi = ʦ(ʲ′X – + ʲi˃i) – ʦ(ʲ′X –),
where ʦ(ʲ′X –) is the likelihood that event Z will occur; Z is either prepayment (column 1), default (column 2), or exit (column 3) from
a subprime mortgage loan within two years of origination; ʦ(.) is the logistic function; X is the vector of explanatory variables, ˃i is
the standard deviation of variable i, and ʲ is the vector of regression coefficients.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.The CLTV ratio’s effect on default is compara-
ble in magnitude (but opposite in sign) to its effect
on prepayment. Less equity in the house, or a
larger LTV ratio, is associated with an increased
probability of default but decreased probability
of prepayment. In both cases, the marginal effect
is about 4.3 percentage points.
The mortgage interest rate has a marginal
effect on the probability of default of 2.3 percent-
age points; recall that in the case of refinancing
it is about double that number. This evidence
seems to indicate that a high mortgage rate gives
borrowers incentives to exit the mortgage through
either prepayment or default.
Exit
Column 3 of Table 1 reports the estimates of
the logit regression with the “exit” being a depen  -
dent variable; that is, each factor is being analyzed
for its impact on prepayment and default com-
bined. According to the estimates, the factors that
have a significant effect on either prepayment or
default have a significant impact on both of these
options combined.6 The only exception is the
CLTV ratio, where the effects on prepayment and
default cancel each other in a joint regression.
ANNUAL FACTOR CONTRIBUTION
TO PREPAYMENT AND DEFAULT
Through the boom and the subsequent bust
of the subprime mortgage market, almost half of
the subprime loan borrowers in the sample termi-
nated their original mortgages through prepayment
or default. The shares of prepayment and default
among the terminated loans, however, varied by
the vintage of those loans. For example, Figure 1
shows that the largest rates of prepayment within
two years of origination were observed for loans
originated in 2002-04.7 This section attempts to
empirically answer the following question: What
observable factors, individually or in combination,
can explain changes in prepayment and default
ratios?
This study uses a method similar to the one
developed by Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008)
to measure the extent each factor explains the
likelihood of prepayment or default for different
mortgage vintages. Specifically, for each year Y
in the sample, the impact of each explanatory
variable i is calculated as the difference between
the logit function ʦ where, for one variable i, the
overall mean is substituted by its mean value in
year Y (the values of all other variables remain at
their overall mean values) and the logit function
where all variables are at their overall mean val-
ues. More formally, the annual factor contribution
(AFCi
Y) for prepayment or default of each variable
i and year Y is calculated by
where ʦ￿ʲ′X
–
￿ is the likelihood that prepayment
or default will occur within 24 months of mortgage
loan origination, ʦ￿.￿ is the logistic function, X is
the vector of explanatory variables, and ʲ is the
vector of regression coefficients.
As shown in Figure 1, within two years of
origination, loans originated in 2001 had delin-
quency and default rates almost as high as loans
originated in 2005. Column 1 of Table 2 shows
the contribution of each factor for this origina-
tion year plus prior and subsequent house price
appreciation.
Table 2 also shows how low FICO credit
scores, high mortgage interest rates, and relatively
low house price appreciation within two years
of origination contributed to high default rates
for the 2001 vintage loans. The mortgage interest
rate continued to be a factor in defaults for vintage
2002 loans but was of a much smaller magnitude.
For 2003 and 2004 vintage loans, only post-
origination house price appreciation (fast and




i = ′ + − ( ) ( )− ′ ( ) Φ Φ β β β ,
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6 Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) and Pennington-Cross and
Chomsisengphet (2007) analyze the determinants of mortgage
termination empirically, using a maximum likelihood framework
analogous to the one used in the current study. However, a simpler
approach has been undertaken here. Instead of a multinomial logit
model (as in the study by Pennington-Cross and Chomsisengphet,
2007) or hazard functions (as in Deng, Quigley, and Van Order, 2000,
or Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2008), a simple logit function is esti-
mated in this study for each of the outcomes of a loan termination.
7 The rates for all subprime loans in the sample (originated as both
refinancings and purchase-money) are remarkably similar to those
documented in Figure 1.positive) contributed to low default rates; defaults
were substituted by prepayment and refinancing
options exercised by borrowers, as discussed
below in greater detail.
For 2005 and 2006 vintage loans, the only
factor that contributed to higher default rates than
those in all other years in the sample was post-
origination house price depreciation. For these
loans, house price appreciation contributed 2.6
and 7.5 percentage points, respectively, in 2005
and 2006 to the increase in the default rates two
years after origination. However, the default rates
for those loans were in fact about 20 to 30 percent,
much higher than the rates explained by house
price appreciation alone.
As shown in Table 3, column 1, the main
contributing factor for high refinance rates within
two years of origination for 2001 vintage loans was
a high mortgage interest rate; its value accounted
for 6.3 percentage points of the average prepay-
ment rate. Post-origination and pre-origination
house price appreciation contributed negatively
to prepayment rates: 4 and 3.4 percentage points,
respectively. A somewhat important factor was the
CLTV ratio prevailing in the market. In 2001, its
value at origination contributed to a 1.2-percentage-
point larger probability of prepayment two years
later.
The value of the prevailing mortgage interest
rate for loans that originated in 2002 was again
the most important contributor to explaining pre-
payment rates. However, the impact of this factor
(see Table 3, column 2) is much smaller compared
with its effect on loans that originated in 2001.
The important contribution of post-origination
house price appreciation is no longer present, as
it was with the 2001 vintage loans, and the con-
tribution of the CLTV ratio has decreased.
For 2003 and 2004 vintage loans, the primary
contributing factor to high prepayment rates
was the house price appreciation that took place
between the origination period and the subsequent
Demyanyk
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Delinquency, Foreclosure, and Default Rate (percent)
Prepayment and Refinance Rate (percent)
Figure 1
Termination of Subprime Purchase-Money Loans Within 12, 24, and 36 Months of Origination by
Origination Year
NOTE: All loans used for this figure were securitized, originated as purchase-money, are first-lien mortgages, and have the borrower
and loan characteristics reported in the data.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on FirstAmerican CoreLogic LoanPerformance loan-level dataset, as of July 2008.two years. For 2003 vintage loans, a diminishing
factor was the pre-origination house price appre-
ciation, which contributed to the decline in the
prepayment rates. For the 2004 vintage loans,
the mortgage interest rate also diminished pre-
payment incentives for subprime borrowers.
For 2005 and 2006 vintage loans, the sole con-
tributing factor for the prepayment and refinance
rate, again, was house price appreciation. How  -
ever, because the housing market slowdown
reversed the trend and house prices depreciated,
the contribution was of the opposite sign com-
pared with earlier years. With all other factors
equal, pre-origination house price appreciation
contributed positively, tending to increase refi-
nance rates; however, post-origination housing
values declined and the lower refinance rates pre-
vailed. In other words, the door to refinancing
opportunity was closed by declining housing
prices and refinancing was largely overtaken by
defaults in the termination rates of subprime
mortgages.
Quick Exits
Surprisingly, almost every other loan exited
the subprime market (in one way or another)
within two years of origination. Moreover, just 30
to 40 percent of all subprime loans in the sample
were purchase-money (used to purchase rather
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Table 2
Annual Factor Contribution to Mortgage Loan Default (2001-06)
Explanatory factor 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
FICO credit score 1.03 0.52 –0.15 –0.14 –0.32 –0.09
If full documentation is provided (dummy) –0.31 –0.11 –0.03 0.02 0.10 0.13
If prepayment penalty is present (dummy) 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 –0.01 –0.03
Debt-to-income ratio (back end) –0.18 –0.23 –0.02 0.06 –0.01 0.30
If debt-to-income ratio is not provided (dummy) 0.10 0.17 –0.01 –0.06 0.03 –0.19
Mortgage interest rate 2.77 1.07 –0.40 –0.87 –0.58 0.66
If an investor (dummy)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
If a mortgage is for refinancing at origination (dummy)  –0.09 –0.05 –0.07 –0.03 0.06 0.10
Origination amount  –0.30 –0.20 –0.07 0.01 0.14 0.19
Combined loan-to-value ratio  –0.96 –0.79 –0.31 0.10 0.46 0.69
Margin for hybrid loans –0.17 0.01 –0.12 0.02 0.08 0.09
If a hybrid (dummy) –0.07 –0.01 –0.04 0.04 0.05 –0.08
If an ARM (dummy) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
If a balloon (dummy) 0.04 –0.06 –0.09 –0.11 –0.02 0.40
Post-origination house price appreciation 2.07 –0.20 –3.00 –2.22 2.63 7.51
Pre-origination house price appreciation 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.05 –0.19 –0.20
NOTE: The annual factor contribution is
AFCi
Y = ʦ(ʲ′X – + ʲi(X –
i
year Y – X –
i)) – ʦ(ʲ′X –),
where for each year Y, the impact of each explanatory variable i (first column) is calculated as the difference between the logit function
ʦ, where, for one variable i, the overall mean is substituted by its mean value in year Y (all other variables remain at their overall mean
values) and the logit function where all variables are at their overall mean values.
ʦ(ʲ′X –) is the likelihood that default will occur within two years of mortgage loan origination, ʦ(.) is the logistic function, X is the
vector of explanatory variables, and ʲ is the vector of regression coefficients.
A mortgage loan is considered in default if a borrower has defaulted on a loan or has missed more than two mortgage payments,
property is in the process of foreclosure, or is real-estate owned (i.e., is likely to default).than refinance a house). The remaining borrowers
refinanced their existing homes, and refinances
do not contribute to an increase in homeowner-
ship.
Jaffee (2008) summarized research that ana-
lyzed what went wrong with the subprime market
that could cause the crisis and what went right—
potential benefits from subprime lending that
might offset consequences of the subprime crisis.
Jaffee calculated that the subprime mortgage mar-
ket funded approximately 5 million home pur-
chases between 2000 and 2006, with slightly more
than 1 million loans to first-time homebuyers.
Jaffee suggests that the subprime mortgage market
had at least one benefit to the economy: the
increase in homeownership.
However, as shown in Figure 1, for all 
purchase-money mortgage loans originated
between 2001 and 2006, between 15 and 25 per-
cent were terminated in the first year, about 50
percent in the first 2 years, and 80 percent in the
first three years. For all origination years, of only
first-lien, home-purchase (purchase-money)
mortgages that were securitized and for which
reliable data were provided, more than 600,000
loans were terminated within the first year after
origination. Within two years, approximately
1.9 million loans were terminated. Among the
terminated loans, about 1 million were seriously
delinquent or in default; the remaining million
were refinanced or prepaid. For subprime mort-
gages, the data seem to suggest that the number
of foreclosed homes, with mortgages funding the
home purchases, already exceeds the estimated
number of first-time homebuyers with subprime
mortgages. 
The number of prepaid and refinanced prop-
erties is less informative because the data do not
provide the after-prepayment outcome of the
mortgages. A refinanced loan can be either a
new subprime loan that follows the original path
described above (a borrower would either default
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Table 3
Annual Factor Contribution to Mortgage Loan Prepayment (2001-06)
Explanatory factor 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
FICO credit score –0.05 –0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
If full documentation is provided (dummy) 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.00 –0.03 –0.03
If prepayment penalty is present (dummy) –0.53 –0.39 –0.14 0.00 0.12 0.28
Debt-to-income ratio (back end) –0.25 –0.30 –0.03 0.08 –0.01 0.39
If debt-to-income ratio is not provided (dummy) 0.12 0.20 –0.01 –0.07 0.04 –0.24
Mortgage interest rate 6.26 2.57 –1.02 –2.24 –1.48 1.60
If an investor (dummy) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
If a mortgage is for refinancing at origination (dummy)  0.21 0.13 0.16 0.08 –0.13 –0.24
Origination amount –1.26 –0.82 –0.31 0.05 0.56 0.77
Combined loan-to-value ratio 1.21 0.99 0.37 –0.12 –0.54 –0.79
Margin for hybrid loans –0.09 0.01 –0.07 0.01 0.04 0.05
If a hybrid (dummy) –1.10 –0.19 –0.59 0.65 0.78 –1.28
If an ARM (dummy) 0.02 0.01 –0.04 –0.02 0.01 0.00
If a balloon (dummy) 0.05 –0.08 –0.14 –0.16 –0.02 0.57
Post-origination house price appreciation –4.12 0.45 8.32 5.79 –5.09 –11.66
Pre-origination house price appreciation –3.39 –3.27 –3.30 –0.81 2.88 3.15
NOTE: See first note to Table 2.
A mortgage loan is considered “prepaid” if a borrower has either paid off or refinanced a mortgage loan within 2 years of origination.or prepay again) or a prime loan (which borrowers
can also default on or prepay). Given the degree
of uncertainty on this issue, no inference based
on the number of prepaid loans is made here.
Even if borrowers refinanced their initial sub-
prime loans into more stable subprime or prime
mortgages (those observed in the data before pre-
payment or refinance), the 80 percent termination
rate within the first three years after origination
would indicate that the initial boom in subprime
lending could have, at most, accelerated growth
of homeownership, even if temporarily. In other
words, in a hypothetical “success” example, if a
borrower took out a subprime loan in 2001, say
as a first-time homebuyer, and then refinanced
into a better loan in 2004, the same borrower most
likely could have skipped the subprime step and
become a first-time homebuyer in 2004, starting
with a more stable loan and avoiding high interest
rate payments and prepayment penalties. Given
the impossibility of knowing when any first-time
homebuyer who used a subprime mortgage would
have become a homeowner with a prime loan, if
ever, the data do not support the argument that
subprime mortgages increased homeownership.
Given that the percentages of terminated loans
in the sample are almost the same for all loan
vintages (origination years), one can infer that
subprime loans rarely were expected or intended
to last much longer than three years. Lenders
must have known that these loans were temporary
(i.e., it would be impossible to collect sufficient
interest payments to cover loan origination costs).
Therefore, prepayment penalties were imposed,
high interest rates and fees were charged, and
complicated loan modifications were designed.
(As well, the securitization structure is very com-
plex, rendering individual loan modifications
almost impossible.) In addition, borrowers must
have been planning to use subprime mortgages
for so-called bridge financing. If subprime bor-
rowers were planning a quick exit from the very
beginning, then these loans were risky not only
from a credit-risk perspective but also from the
standpoint of interest rate risk (would rates go up?)
and liquidity risk (would there be a possibility
to refinance?). Given these risks, lenders and
investors could experience much higher losses
than expected purely on the basis of credit risk.
In hindsight, we know that the risks did material-
ize and the losses did skyrocket.
CONCLUSION
The subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 resulted
in a massive wave of foreclosures and serious
delinquencies, a large proportion of which con-
sisted of mortgages originated in 2006 and 2007.
Much of the debate among researchers and policy-
makers involves causes, consequences, and reme-
dies for these early defaults and foreclosures. Still
unexplained, however, is the temporary nature
of subprime loans. This study shows that loans
that originated in any year from 2001 to 2006
generally had a life of less than three years. In
fact, almost half of these loans exited the market
through either prepayment or default within the
first two years after origination; about 80 percent
of them did so within three years.
Even though mortgage termination rates have
been remarkably similar for all origination years
evaluated one, two, or three years after origination,
the split between default and prepayment rates
varied. There is a J shape in the graphed represen-
tation of defaults for origination years 2001 to
2006. The trough of the pattern corresponds to
the years 2003 and 2004, when the housing mar-
ket was booming. When default rates are small,
refinancing rates are high. When the trend in the
housing market reversed, refinancing became
impossible and defaults took their place.
The evidence in this paper is consistent with
that reported by Demyanyk and van Hemert
(2008), who explain that the crisis—the unusually
high default rates among 2006 and 2007 vintage
loans—did not occur because these loans were
in some respects much worse than all loans that
originated earlier. Subprime mortgages were very
risky all along; however, their true riskiness was
hidden by rapid house price appreciation, allow-
ing mortgage termination by refinancing/prepay-
ment to take place. When prepayment became
very costly (with zero or negative equity in the
house increasing the closing costs of a refinanc-
ing), defaults took their place.
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subprime lending did not increase homeowner-
ship: The number of defaults in a limited sample
(about 50 percent) of subprime purchase-money
mortgages within two years of origination is almost
equal to the estimated number of first-time home-
buyers who took subprime mortgages. If the data
for the rest of the market were available, the num-
ber of defaults would no doubt be even greater.
Several questions remain and require further
attention. First, the available data do not help
identify what happened to loans that were termi-
nated but did not end in default (i.e., prepaid or
refinanced loans). Mortgages originated for refi-
nancing tend to be refinanced again within a cou-
ple of years and tend to default as well. If more
comprehensive data become available, further
analysis on the homeownership policy discussion
may be fruitful. Foote et al. (2008) raise the same
question and explain the difficulty in answering
it. Second, several studies indicate that most of
the materialized risks associated with subprime
mortgage lending had been neither observable
nor measurable (e.g., the credit score did not
predict likelihood of default; see Demyanyk and
Van Hemert, 2008, and Haughwout, Peach, and
Tracy, 2008). Little is known about these risks
except that they existed and increased over time.
More sophisticated models and comprehensive
data are needed to answer these questions.
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